This paper addresses certain methodological issues that arise in estimating abnormal (or discretionary) accruals for detection of event-specific earnings management. Unlike prior studies (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996) that rely primarily on time-series models, we focus on the specification of cross-sectional models of expected accruals using quarterly as well as annual data. Perhaps more importantly, we present a variation of the Jones model that is shown to be well specified for all cash flow levels. We show that the cross-sectional Jones model yields systematically positive (negative) estimates of abnormal accruals for firms whose cash flows are below (above) their industry median. Using mean squared prediction errors as well as simulation analysis, we show that our model is more powerful than the cross-sectional Jones model in detecting earnings management. In addition, we examine differences in the power of current accrual models in detecting earnings management across audited and unaudited quarters.
Introduction
Earnings management around firm-specific events has received considerable attention from researchers in recent years. Much of the research in this literature uses discretionary accruals (or, more accurately, abnormal accruals) to examine earnings management, where abnormal accruals are defined as actual accruals minus expected accruals. Given the importance of the expectations model in estimating abnormal accruals, it is essential to use the most precise models of expected accruals available in tests of earnings management. Several studies have addressed the adequacies and inadequacies of the extant models for estimating discretionary accruals, focusing typically on time-series estimation. We extend this literature in two ways. First, we introduce a new model that controls explicitly for the level of cash flows, and we examine its specification and power to detect abnormal accruals. Second, we assess the adequacy of the currently available accrual models using cross-sectional estimation procedures and quarterly as well as annual data.
The focus of this paper is to improve the methodology for detecting event-specific earnings management (such as earnings management around seasoned equity offerings, IPOs, import relief investigations, etc.) and does not directly address studies where there is no firm-specific event (such as studies examining earnings management to increase managerial compensation or to smooth reported earnings). Studies of event-specific earnings management typically study the mean abnormal accruals across event firms and test whether the mean is significantly different from zero (see, e.g., Jones (1991) , DeAngelo (1986 DeAngelo ( , 1988 . A mean that is significantly different from zero is interpreted as being consistent with earnings management related to the event under examination. In arriving at this conclusion, such studies implicitly assume that the mean abnormal accruals would have been zero in the absence of the firm-specific event. One of the objectives of this paper is to test the validity of this assumption. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) examine a few of the currently available, time-series based accrual models for misspecification and statistical power and argue that while the models examined are well specified for randomly chosen firms, they are misspecified for firms with extreme cash flows. They also find these models to have low power in detecting earnings management. Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) examine the same models as Dechow, et al. (1995) , also in a time-series context, and present evidence consistent with their argument that all the models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision. 1 In this paper, we present a modification of the Jones model and test the specification of this model. 2 Whereas other earnings management models do not control for the strong negative relation between total accruals and cash flows, we introduce variables to control for changes in cash flows over time. This extension of the Jones model is shown to be well specified for all cash flow levels and to exhibit more power than the conventional Jones model in detecting earnings management.
Cross-sectional models have been generally well received in the literature and have been used in a number of papers (e. g., Defond and Jiambalvo,1994; Chaney, Jeter and Lewis, 1998; Subramanyam, 1996) . Since the parameter estimates from cross-sectional models are conceptually different from those obtained using time-series models, it is of interest to examine the specification and power of cross-sectional models. In the final section of the paper, we summarize the results of our estimation of the parameters of the time-series models as a contrast to the cross-sectional estimation presented throughout the paper.
Although most earnings management research is based on annual data, a few recent studies use quarterly data to detect earnings management (e.g., Shivakumar, 1997; Rangan, 1998) . The use of quarterly data has several advantages in detecting earnings management around specific corporate events. Quarterly data provides a sharper focus on the event, which could increase the likelihood of detecting earnings management. Also, financial statements for interim quarters are often unaudited, allowing greater managerial discretion and requiring less detailed disclosure than annual financial statements. These differences provide managers greater opportunities to manage earnings and hence, make detection of earnings management more likely in interim quarters. Due to the advantages of using quarterly data, we evaluate the specification and the power of a variety of well-known models on this data. Accrual models that are well specified for annual data are not necessarily well specified for quarterly data for several reasons. For example, if managers defer bad news to the fourth quarter, a positive bias may result in abnormal accruals estimated in interim quarters with a compensating negative bias in the fourth quarter. Given the preponderance of earnings management studies based on annual data, we evaluate these models using annual data as well. In addition, we examine possible differences in the degree of earnings management in audited (fourth) quarters versus unaudited (interim) quarters using a random sample of firms.
Using simulation analyses similar to those performed by Brown and Warner (1985) , we derive the following major conclusions. Our results are consistent with Dechow, et al.'s (1995) findings for time-series models in several respects. We find evidence that the cross-sectional Jones model is well specified for random firms but misspecified for firms whose cash flows deviate systematically from the industry median. Extending the Jones model to explicitly control for cash from operations, as proposed in Shivakumar (1996) , yields a model that is well specified for all cash flow levels. The abnormal accruals estimated from the cross-sectional models appear to be less imprecise than those estimated by Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) using the time-series models. Finally, across a random sample of firms, there is greater evidence of noise and/or earnings management in the fourth quarter than in the interim quarters. In view of the complexities that arise in the fourth quarter related to settling up or "house cleaning," and the difficulty inherent in separating noise from earnings management in the fourth quarter, we suggest that tests of earnings management may be less powerful in these quarters than in interim quarters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the various models examined here, while section 3 discusses managers' incentives and opportunities to manage earnings in interim quarters versus the fourth quarter. In section 4, we describe the methodology adopted to test the specification and the power of the various models, section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
Estimating Discretionary Accruals
Studies examining earnings management typically decompose total accruals into expected (or non-discretionary) accruals and abnormal (or discretionary) accruals, a procedure that relies heavily on the descriptive accuracy of the expectations model used. Most of the models of expected accruals require the estimation of one or more parameters. The parameters of timeseries models are estimated for each firm in the sample using data from periods prior to the event period. In contrast, the parameters of cross-sectional models are estimated each period for each firm in the event sample using contemporaneous accounting data of firms in the same industry.
The time-series models and the cross-sectional models provide conceptually different estimates of abnormal accruals due to differences in their approaches for estimating expected accruals. To estimate model parameters, time-series models use data from an estimation period during which no systematic earnings management is expected to occur. Cross-sectional models make no assumptions regarding systematic earnings management in the estimation sample but implicitly assume that the model parameters are the same across all firms in an estimation sample.
The abnormal accruals estimated from these models can be interpreted as 'industry-relative' abnormal accruals. To see this, consider an industry that is enjoying favorable economic conditions. If firms smooth reported earnings, then the 'actual' abnormal accruals for the firms in this industry will be negative. Cross-sectional models are unlikely to capture all the negative abnormal accruals, however, since the earnings management is contemporaneously correlated across firms in the sample. Thus only those firms whose accruals are negative relative to the industry benchmark will be identified as earnings managers. This introduces a potential limitation of the cross-sectional approach, or a bias against finding evidence of earnings management in some cases.
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Nonetheless these 'industry-relative' abnormal accruals can be a useful tool for researchers examining event-specific earnings management. By controlling for industry-wide earnings management, cross-sectional models enable researchers to detect earnings management above and beyond the average unconditional earnings management found in that industry. It is this type of earnings management that is the focus of this study, and thus its primary relevance is for event studies. Certainly time-series models can be modified to control for industry-or economy-wide earnings management as well. Though time-series models can be used to estimate a firm's 'actual' abnormal accruals, these models suffer from severe survivorship bias as well as selection bias. Typically, time-series models (such as the Jones model) require at least ten observations in the estimation period to obtain minimally reliable parameter estimates. For studies using annual data, this requirement implies that the sample firms must survive for at least eleven years. Since such firms are more likely to be large, mature firms with greater reputational capital to lose if earnings management is uncovered, this methodology introduces a selection bias. In contrast to time-series models, the cross-sectional approach has the practical advantage of generating larger samples, but it does not generate firm-specific coefficients.
We briefly discuss below the various models that are examined here. For each event quarter, the model parameters are estimated from a cross-sectional regression using contemporaneous accounting data of firms in the same two-digit SIC code.
Jones Model
The Jones model attempts to estimate expected accruals after controlling for changes in a firm's economic environment. Expected accruals under the Jones model is measured by:
where ∆rev it is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1; gppe it is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t; and a it-1 is the book value of total assets at the end of period t-1. β 1 , β 2 and β 3 are firm-specific parameters that are estimated (using firms in the same two-digit SIC code) from the following OLS regression:
acc it /a it-1 = b 1 (1/a it-1 ) + b 2 (∆rev it /a it-1 ) + b 3 (gppe it /a it-1 ) + ε i
where acc it is the actual accruals of firm i in period t; and b 1 , b 2 and b 3 are the OLS estimates of β 1 , β 2 and β 3 , respectively.
This model treats revenues as entirely non-discretionary. However, if earnings are managed by shifting revenues from future periods, then ∆rev it would be endogenous to the model. In order to control for this endogeniety bias, Dechow, et al. (1995) propose a modification to the Jones model, in which the expected accruals are computed as:
where ∆rec it is defined as the change in receivables for firm i from period t-1 to period t. The estimates of β 1 , β 2 and β 3 are those obtained from the original Jones model. The only modification relative to the Jones model is that the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables for each sample firm. This modified version of the Jones model implicitly assumes that all changes in uncollected credit sales at the end of the event period result from earnings management. The reasoning behind this modification is that earnings are easier to manage via credit sales than cash collections.
Though the modified Jones model attempts to control for the endogeniety bias in the original Jones model, it potentially introduces a bias of its own. First, the assumption that all changes in uncollected credit sales result from earnings management is unlikely to be valid, resulting in overcorrection. Secondly, this modification is only appropriate during periods when earnings are actually managed in this manner. However, in most event-specific studies of earnings management, the periods in which earnings are actually managed are not known to the researcher (e.g., the precise quarter within the event year), and uniformly applying this modification to all event quarters or event years could lead to further misspecification. For example, some firms might manage earnings in all four quarters of the event year, while others might manage earnings in only one or two. Finally, the reasoning underlying the modification suggests that changes in receivables should be in the same direction as the hypothesized management of earnings. This then raises the issue as to whether or not a researcher should apply the same modification to firms for which the change in receivables is opposite in direction to that of the change in revenues.
CFO Model
Prior studies (Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Sabino and Sloan, 1996) have documented a negative relation between cash flows and accruals even in the presumed absence of any systematic earnings management. Moreover, Dechow, et al. (1995) show that the time-series Jones model is not well specified for firms with extreme cash flows. Since this misspecification may be due to the fact that the Jones model does not control for cash from operations, some recent studies have incorporated cash from operations as an extension of the Jones model. See, for example, Rees, Gill, and Gore (1996) , Hansen and Sarin (1996) , and Shivakumar (1997) .
We test the power and degree of misspecification of the extended Jones model that controls for cash from operations. In particular, we test the model developed by Shivakumar (1996) since this model is quite general. Shivakumar (1996) argues the existence of a non-linear relationship between cash from operations (cfo) and accruals in cross-sectional data. that are included in earnings before extraordinary items, the computed amount does not necessarily equal in every case the cash from operations reported in a firm's statement of cash flows. Nonetheless we chose this specification because of its consistency with prior studies, and because our purpose is largely to examine the performance of the accruals models used in accounting research studies.
Firms in each estimation sample are sorted into quintiles based on cfo it /a it-1 , and d1 i to d5 i are indicators for the cash flow quintile to which a firm belongs. The firm-specific parameters, κ 0 through κ 7 , are estimated similarly to the estimation of parameters for the Jones model.
Abnormal accruals in interim quarters versus fourth quarter
In this paper, we examine the specification and the relative power of the accrual models across fiscal quarters in view of the possibility that differences across quarters may affect the ability of the models to detect event-specific earnings management. We examine the specification of For example, since the estimation sample consists of firms in the same industry, extreme differences in cash flows amo ng firms are more likely to result from matching or timing differences than from differences in return on assets. In contrast, firms with cash flows near their industry median are likely to be "steady state" firms, as defined in Dechow (1994) , with relatively less variability in cash flows arising from timing or matching issues.
In the present paper we have chosen the non-linear specification because it is more general and does not constrain firms with extremely low cash flows to have the same slope coefficient as firms with moderate or high cash flows.
alternative models in various quarters in part because of the bad news deferral argument presented by Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) . Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) argue that managers have an income increasing bias in the interim quarters and defer bad news to the fourth quarter. This argument suggests that the average discretionary accruals could be positive in interim quarters and negative in the fourth quarter. This interpretation of Mendenhall and Nichols' argument implies that tests for the null hypothesis of no earnings management may be rejected in all quarters.
Apart from specification issues, the power of accruals models in detecting event-specific earnings management may also vary across quarters depending on managerial incentives and/or opportunities for earnings management in the quarters. Specifically, the quarters in which managers have greater incentives (unrelated to the event of interest) or greater opportunities for earnings management will include more noise in the abnormal accrual estimates, lowering the ability of the model to detect earnings management. Incentives and opportunities for earnings management are likely to vary across interim and final quarters for at least three distinct, but not mutually exclusive, reasons. First, the absence of an independent audit in interim quarters provides managers greater opportunities to manipulate earnings. Second, managers may be less concerned about manipulating the numbers for interim reports, as compensation plans and debt covenants are generally focused on year-end reports. Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that managers, on average, report their good-faith best estimates in the interim periods and correct those estimates, as needed, in the fourth period. We elaborate upon each of these issues next.
Financial statements for interim quarters may be argued to allow for greater use of discretion on the part of managers than the financial statements for the fourth quarter or the annual statements. Whether this discretion improves or detracts from the quality of the reported earnings numbers is not entirely a resolved issue. Sankar and Subramanyam (1997) discuss the relative advantages of allowing discretion and of restricting (or constraining) the extent of discretion allowed. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), firms may use estimates for certain costs and expenses (such as damages and losses in inventory, income tax expense, LIFO liquidation) in interim quarters. The actual amount of these expenses need not be determined until the fiscal year end, at which time any difference between the estimates and the actual for the previous quarters is adjusted. The use of estimates for expenses in the interim quarters provides managers with greater opportunities to manage reported earnings without violating GAAP.
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Further, for timely reporting of financial information, quarterly reports are often unaudited and require much less disclosure than annual reports.
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The actual degree of discretion exercised by managers in interim quarters depends not only on their opportunities but also upon their incentives for managing earnings. These incentives, in turn, may lead to differences in the performance of alternative models across quarters. We restrict the following discussion of incentives for earnings management to those that we deem as most likely to be common to managers from a random sample of firms since our empirical analyses are based on randomly selected firms. First, managers may manage earnings to avoid violating debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) . Secondly, they may manage earnings to report a smooth or gradually increasing pattern of reported earnings (Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Subramanyam, 1996; Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis, 1998) . Third, managers may manage earnings to maximize their bonus compensations (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995; Gaver, Gaver and Austin, 1995) . While managers' incentives to avoid debt covenant violations and to smooth reported earnings may impact financial statements in all quarters, their incentives are heightened in the fourth quarter. Often it is not until this quarter that managers are aware of their exact (or even, in some cases, approximate) position with regard to bonus plans or income smoothing targets. Hence, if bonus compensations and/or achieving a specified target level of earnings are important incentives for earnings management, we would expect managers to exercise greater discretion in the fourth quarter than in the interim quarters.
The prevalence of the fourth quarter as the time to adjust or correct interim period estimates (or misestimates), as well as any incentives for managers to achieve target levels of annual earnings, suggest that we should find greater variation in our estimates of abnormal accruals in the fourth quarter. However, the opportunity to exercise discretion is likely to be greater in unaudited quarters, in which case we might expect the opposite; i.e., more variation in the abnormal accrual estimates in interim quarters.
Methodology and Sample Construction

Test of specification of models
In order for a regression-based expectations model to be effective in estimating discretionary accruals and thus in testing for earnings management, it is essential that the model be well specified in the context in which it is used. We test the specification of the various models by examining the mean abnormal accruals for randomly selected samples of firm-periods. 7 Due to the random selection of firm-periods, no systematic earnings management is expected in our samples. Hence, if the models are well specified, we should not reject the null hypothesis of a mean of zero for these samples.
Recall that the focus of this paper is to test the specification of models used in detecting eventspecific earnings management rather than the type of management that may occur in the absence of a firm-specific event (such as managers' incentives to maximize compensation or to smooth reported earnings). The methodology adopted in our study can be justified even if individual firms manipulate earnings in other ways, such as smoothing, since our focus is on means rather than on individual firms. Since no systematic earnings management is expected in our random samples, we expect the mean abnormal accruals across the firms to be insignificantly different from zero.
Some firms in the random sample may overstate earnings while others may be understating earnings. The presumption in event-specific studies of earnings management is that these overstatements and understatements should cancel out in a random sample.
Our specification tests are based on a simulation method similar to the one used by Brown and Warner (1985) . This method is implemented by forming 200 samples of 100 randomly selected firms from the universe of firms available on COMPUSTAT. The firms in each sample are chosen without replacement to ensure that the observations within a sample are independent.
Each firm is then assigned a randomly chosen period as the event period, and the abnormal accruals are estimated for this event period using alternative accrual models. The average abnormal accruals across firms are then computed for each sample, and these averages are evaluated across the samples to identify significant deviations in the frequency of type I errors from conventional test levels.
Since Dechow, et al. (1995) find the time-series Jones model to be misspecified for firms with extreme cash flows, we also examine the specification of the expected accrual models after controlling for the cash flow levels of the firms. We implement this by selecting a thousand firmperiods in each cash flow quintile and testing whether the average discretionary accruals across firms in each quintile are significantly different from zero. The quintiles are formed for each period and for each industry by sorting the firms in that industry based on their cash from operations.
The indicator variables d1 i , d2 i , d3 i , d4 i and d5 i designate the quintile from the CFO model. We select 1000 firm-periods for which d1 i =1, 1000 firm-periods for which d2 i =1, etc. The mean abnormal accruals for the 1000 firm-periods in each quintile are then tested for significant differences from zero using t-tests. The t-test in analysis of means can be justified since the means are asymptotically normally distributed according to the Central Limit Theorem. To control for possible heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional means, we use the White's (1980) standard errors to compute the t-statistics.
Tests of models' power in detecting earning management
We examine the power of the various models in detecting earnings management using the Brown and Warner simulation method. We test the power of the competing models by artificially introducing earnings management of a fixed and known amount in the firm-periods selected. We then examine the mean abnormal accruals and evaluate the frequency with which the alternative models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management.
As noted by Dechow, et al. (1995) , the ability of the models to detect earnings management depends on the components of accruals that are managed. We follow a similar approach to that of Dechow, et al. and make two different sets of assumptions regarding the components of accruals that are manipulated:
(1) Expense manipulation: this type of manipulation assumes that accruals are manipulated by delaying the recognition of expenses. This approach to accrual manipulation is implemented by adding an assumed amount of manipulation to total accruals in the event period. Since none of the models considered in this paper uses expenses to estimate expected accruals, we do not adjust any of the other variables in this analysis.
(2) Revenue manipulation: under this type of manipulation, accrual manipulation is assumed to occur through premature recognition of revenues. This approach is implemented by adding the assumed amount of sales manipulation to both total accruals and ∆rev it in all the models.
The above types of manipulation provide us with the bounds on the ability of the models to detect earnings management. As discussed earlier, the models examined in this study suffer from endogeniety bias when earnings are manipulated through revenues. Moreover, as shown by Dechow, et al. (1995) , this bias would reduce the ability of the models to detect earnings management. By assuming that all manipulation occurs through revenue, the revenue manipulation provides a lower bound on the ability of these models to detect earnings management. On the other hand, expense manipulation assumes that no manipulation occurs through revenue, thereby completely avoiding the endogeniety bias. Hence, this type of manipulation provides the upper bound to the ability of the models to detect earnings management. In reality, both types of manipulation are likely to be important sources of accrual manipulation and, hence, the actual ability of the models to detect earnings management would lie between these bounds.
Tests of specification and power of models across quarters
To demonstrate possible differences in the ability of the models to detect earnings management
across various quarters, we analyze the abnormal accruals in each of the quarterly financial statements for 1000 randomly selected firm-years. Observations are included in the sample for a given firm-year only if we have data available to estimate abnormal accruals in each of the quarters for that year. We initially examine the estimates of abnormal accruals in each quarter for the selected observations. This is intended to test the specification of the models in the various quarters and to examine the bad news deferral argument of Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) . To investigate the amount of management and/or noise in the various quarters, we use the squared abnormal accruals. If managers have and exercise the same degree of discretion in all the quarters and if the level of noise is approximately the same in all quarters, then the squared abnormal accruals are expected to be the same across the quarters. On the other hand, if managers manage earnings more in certain quarters than in others, or if some quarters include more noise than others, then we expect larger squared abnormal accruals for such quarters.
Another way of viewing the effects of management and/or noise on the squared abnormal accruals is to consider the squared abnormal accruals, which are nothing more than squared prediction errors, as measuring the power of the models in detecting event-specific earnings management. Quarters in which we find squared abnormal accruals to be relatively high are quarters in which managers exercise greater discretion even in the absence of event-specific earnings management. For these quarters, the estimates of abnormal accruals in studies of eventspecific earnings management would be particularly noisy, reducing the power of the tests for earnings management.
Results
This study examines earnings management using both annual and quarterly data that are obtained from 1994 COMPUSTAT. The firm-periods for which we estimate abnormal accruals are selected from 390,880 firm-quarters between 1984 and 1994 for analyses using quarterly data and from 171,478 firm-years between 1975 and 1994 for analyses using annual data.
We require at least twenty observations in the cross-sectional sample for estimating the parameters of cross-sectional models. We exclude highly influential observations by deleting observations which have absolute values of DFFITS greater than 2. 8 This exclusion criterion is intended to provide us parameter estimates that are representative of the sample.
The use of a constant definition for accruals across all firms introduces certain large and unusual observations, such as acquisitions, asset write-offs included in operating income, etc., which might invalidate our estimate of accruals. 9 Thus it is crucial to control for highly influential or anomalous observations. Such observations could impact both our estimates of the parameters of the various models and the estimated abnormal accruals. To control for their influence, we exclude any observation for which the magnitude of our estimate of abnormal accruals is greater than two hundred percent of the total assets for the firm. Excluding abnormal accruals in excess of two hundred percent of total assets seems conservative, as it is unlikely that a manager would be able to manipulate earnings to such an extent without being detected. Hence we feel fairly certain that such observations are anomalous. 10 Further, the results are qualitatively similar when the exclusion criterion is set at 100% of total assets rather than 200% as the cut-off.
Sample statistics for accruals
Since all our analyses are based on total accruals, we initially examine the distribution of total accruals for 1000 randomly selected firm-years. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for total accruals. The mean and the median accruals are negative, which is not surprising since a major component of total accruals is depreciation expense, a negative number. Also, the mean accruals are higher than the median accruals. Further, the kurtosis of the accruals for this set of firm-years is 31.86, indicating that the distribution has thick tails relative to a normal distribution.
Finally, table 1 presents the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic for normality. Using this statistic, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that all the accruals come from a normal distribution with the same mean and variance.
Cross-sectional models
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the specification tests for abnormal accruals estimated using cross-sectional models and annual data. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the parameter estimates and abnormal accruals for 1000 randomly selected firm-years, while table 3 analyzes the frequency of type I errors in two hundred randomly selected samples.
From Panel A of table 2, we observe that the mean and the median intercept terms are insignificant for the Jones model. Also, the coefficient for the change in revenues is positive in 93% of the regressions and is statistically significant for the average regression. Also, as expected, the coefficient for gross property, plant and equipment is significantly negative.
Moreover, this coefficient is negative in 93% of the regressions. The average regression yields an adjusted R-square of 39% and uses 91 observations in the estimation sample. on the cash flow variables are all negative as expected. Moreover, the coefficients for the cash flow variables in the extreme quintiles tend to be negative more often and are also more significant than the coefficients for cash flows in other quintiles. This is consistent with an expectation that the timing and matching problems are more severe for firms with extreme cash flows than for firms with cash flows closer to their industry median. Finally, in contrast to the Jones model, the average adjusted R-square for this model is 68%. This suggests that the CFO model is able to explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in accruals.
Panel C of table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the abnormal accruals estimated for the 1000 firm-years. The mean abnormal accruals for the Jones model and for the CFO model are not significantly different from zero, consistent with a claim that both the models are well specified.
This conclusion is further supported by the results from analyzing the frequency of type I errors in 200 randomly selected samples with 100 firm-periods in each sample (a variation of the methodology used by Brown and Warner). The results from this analysis, which are presented in table 3, indicate that the null hypothesis of no earnings management is not rejected more often than expected using either of the cross-sectional models.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results corresponding to tables 2 and 3 using quarterly rather than annual data. The parameter estimates for both the Jones and the CFO models are comparable to those obtained using annual data. However, the adjusted R-square for the Jones model is only 14% for quarterly data compared to 39% for annual data. In contrast, the adjusted R-square for the CFO model drops only slightly, to 66% for quarterly data from 68% for annual data. These statistics indicate that the CFO model not only explains a greater part of the cross-sectional variation in accruals than the Jones model but is also more stable across the type of data used in the analysis.
Panel C of table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the estimated abnormal accruals. The mean abnormal accruals are insignificantly different from zero for both the models, suggesting that the models are well specified. Also, interestingly, the sign test for the median indicates that the median of abnormal accruals from the CFO model is significantly positive. This finding, along with the result that the mean of abnormal accruals is insignificantly different from zero, suggests that when discretionary accruals are negative (income decreasing), they tend to be relatively large.
This is consistent with a 'big-bath' hypothesis that managers may combine large or numerous negative 'hits' or information into one period in the hope of benefiting future periods. Table 5 presents the results of the incidence of type I errors for the quarterly sample. The results show that both the cross-sectional models are well specified for quarterly data. The rejection frequency for the null hypothesis of no earnings management is close to the specified test levels for both models.
In summary, the results in this section indicate that the Jones and the CFO models are well specified for randomly chosen firms for both annual and quarterly data. In the next section, we examine the specification of the models for firms with extreme performance as measured by their cash flows, focusing on the analysis of cross-sectional models using quarterly data.
Firm performance and abnormal accruals
Our initial analysis of the relation between the estimates of abnormal accruals and firm performance is based on 1000 randomly selected firm-quarters in each cash flow quintile. Table   6 presents the descriptive abnormal accruals for firm-quarters in each of the cash flow quintiles. 
Samples of firm-quarters with artificially induced earnings management.
To evaluate the power of the accruals models in detecting earnings management, we begin with the 200 random samples of 100 firm-quarters each that are used to determine the proportion of type I errors (see table 5 ). For each sampled firm, we then add three levels of accrual manipulation (1%, 2% and 5% of total assets) to the estimated abnormal accruals and to ∆rev it , if manipulation occurs through revenues. Our choice of the level of manipulation is guided by past research, where most studies have reported magnitudes of manipulation that vary between 1%
and 5% of total assets (e.g., Shivakumar, 1997; DeAngelo, 1986 DeAngelo, , 1988 .
The results from this simulation are summarized in table 8. This table lists the frequency with which the null hypothesis is rejected using conventional test levels of 5% and 1%. For this analysis, we consider both the null hypothesis that discretionary accruals are less than or equal to zero and the null hypothesis that discretionary accruals are greater than or equal to zero. Table 8 also presents descriptive statistics of the abnormal accruals across the 200 samples used in the analyses.
Panel A reports the simulation results when the magnitude of manipulation is 1% of total assets.
As expected, both the Jones and the CFO models reject the null hypothesis that discretionary accruals are less than or equal to zero more frequently than the specified test levels. Using the test level of 5%, the rejection frequency for the Jones model is 25.5% when accrual manipulation occurs through expenses. This rejection frequency almost doubles to 45% when the CFO model is used. The corresponding rejection frequencies for the two models when manipulation occurs through revenues are 38.5% and 20% for the CFO and Jones models respectively. Little difference is observed in the mean abnormal accruals between the CFO and Jones models, with quintiles even if the firm has poor cash flow performance relative to the other firms in its industry. The results from this analysis are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper. Table 9 reports the results from analyzing the discretionary accruals in each quarter for 1000 randomly selected firm-years. This analysis is intended to examine the specification of alternative models in relation to differences in the degree of accounting discretion exercised by managers in the various quarters of the fiscal year. Panel A of Recall that various explanations related to either (or both) management's incentives and opportunities may be posited as to why abnormal accruals might be expected to vary across quarters. Our purpose is not to distinguish among these alternative explanations but rather to examine the methodological differences across quarters, if any. In so doing, we may be able to glean some insight or at least speculate as to the validity of the various arguments related to earnings management.
Ability of accrual models to detect earnings management across quarters
From Panel A of table 9, we observe that the mean abnormal accruals are insignificantly different from zero in all the quarters for both the Jones and the CFO models. This suggests that the models are well specified for all the quarters. This finding may appear to be inconsistent with the bad news deferral argument of Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) , which suggests that the discretionary accruals might be positive in interim quarters and negative in fourth quarters.
However, it should be noted that the cross-sectional models are unlikely to detect the bad news deferral if such deferral is correlated across several firms within the industry. More importantly, the results suggest that the models are well specified for tests of event-specific earnings management. Further, the median of abnormal accruals from the CFO model is significantly positive in all four quarters. This, considered in conjunction with a mean near zero, suggests that those firms that report negative abnormal accruals may report larger (in absolute value) accruals than those firms which report positive abnormal accruals. This evidence is consistent with a "big bath" argument, as it suggests that when discretionary accruals are negative (income decreasing), they tend to be relatively large. Firms may choose to cluster a number of negative items (writeoffs, charges, etc.) into one period in the hope of improving future income. For both the Jones and the CFO models, the proportions of abnormal accruals greater than zero are lowest in the fourth quarter.
From Panel B of table 9, we observe that the mean and the median squared abnormal accruals for both the Jones and the CFO models tend to be higher in the fourth quarter than in all other quarters. Moreover, from panel C we find that the median squared abnormal accruals from the CFO model is significantly greater in the fourth quarter than in any of the interim quarters.
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Similar results are obtained for the Jones model from comparing abnormal accruals in the fourth quarter with the abnormal accruals in the second and the third quarters. However, the median squared abnormal accruals for the fourth quarter estimated using the Jones model is not significantly different from that of the first quarter, possibly due to the greater noise in estimates of abnormal accruals from the Jones model.
The larger squared abnormal accruals in the fourth quarters suggest that the incentives of managers to achieve target year-end earnings or the added noise in fourth quarter accruals from correcting interim reports' estimates dominate the greater opportunities available for earnings management in interim quarters. The existence of more pronounced target-driven earnings management in the fourth quarter, despite the audited nature of the annual report, has the potential to explain both the greater discretionary accruals and the differential stock response documented by Kross and Schroeder (1990) , relative to interim periods.
Regardless of which of the three reasons posited for differences across quarters (or which combination of the three) is operative, the larger squared abnormal accruals in the fourth quarters suggests that tests of event-specific earnings management may be less powerful in these quarters than in interim quarters. The extent of noise, or manipulation, in fourth quarters will also lower the power of tests using annual data in detecting earnings management around specific events.
Time-series models
To estimate the parameters of the time-series models, we required each estimation sample to have at least ten observations from the period prior to the event period (admittedly an arbitrary cut-off). The lower number of observations used in time-series models reflects the limited availability of observations in the time-series samples and introduces a significant limitation of this analysis. 13 Hence we do not present these results but summarize them briefly. Tables are available upon request from the authors. 12 We do not report the t-statistics for squared abnormal accruals as the squared abnormal accruals are not normally distributed. 13 Since the data requirements for time-series models differ from the data requirements for cross-sectional models, the sample firm-periods used in analyses of cross-sectional models differ from the sample firm-periods used in analyses of time-series models. Also, the samples vary for a given model and a given sample depending on whether annual or quarterly data are used in the analysis.
When we estimated the parameters of the time-series Jones model for 1000 firm-years, we found the intercept term to be positive on average, as were the mean and the median coefficients for ∆rev it . The average coefficient on the gppe it was negative, as expected since gppe it is included in the regressions to capture depreciation expense, a negative accrual. However, none of the coefficients were significant for the average regression. Further, the standard errors for intercept and gppe it coefficients were very high relative to their mean and median coefficient values. Results for the time-series CFO model were similar, with the exception that the median coefficient for ∆rev it was significant for the time-series CFO model. Further, as expected, the median coefficient on cfo it was significantly negative. 14 When we estimated the incidence of type I errors for 200 randomly selected samples with 100 firm-periods in each sample, we found that the observed rejection frequencies were significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level for both the time-series Jones model and the CFO model. Both the models provided mean abnormal accruals that were significantly negative more often than would occur by chance. Finally, in contrast to the cross-sectional Jones model, the standard errors for all the parameters are relatively large, indicating greater imprecision in the parameter estimates.
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Since this evidence, taken as a whole, could be interpreted in one of two ways (either as model misspecification or as the result of imprecise parameter estimates yielding unreliable estimates of abnormal accruals), we do not dwell on the time-series results. Instead we summarize them mainly as a contrast to the cross-sectional analysis presented previously. The above discussion suggests that time-series models may provide unreliable estimates of abnormal accruals when the number of observations used in estimating the parameters is small (as in the case of annual data). However, increasing the number of observations in the estimation sample raises the issue of survivorship bias. Further, as noted by Jones (1991) , increasing the number of observations also raises the question of possible structural changes in the models. Hence, 14 For the time-series CFO model, we include the level of cash from operations as an explanatory variable without the indicator variables that sorted firms into cash flow quintiles in our cross-sectional CFO model. 15 One possible explanation for the imprecision of our time-series parameter estimates is that we use only preevent data in our time-series regressions, as we are replicating studies of actual earnings management. Dechow, et al. (1995) , in contrast, regressed accruals on specific variables both before and after an artificially chosen event year. This difference may cause our time-series estimates to be less precise than those of Dechow, et al. increasing the size of the estimation sample involves a trade-off between non-stationarity of parameters and survivorship bias on the one hand and precision of the parameter estimates on the other.
In summary, based on our analyses presented in the preceding sections, the cross-sectional estimation of the Jones and the CFO models produces results consistent with an argument that the models are well specified for randomly chosen firms, while the time-series estimation does not.
However, this comparison is tempered by the limited availability of observations in the time-series samples. Finally, our findings with regard to time-series estimation are largely consistent with the concerns raised by Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) .
Conclusion
Since earnings management studies depend critically on having unbiased and precise estimates of abnormal accruals, we examine the specification and statistical power of cross-sectional models of expected accruals. We also introduce and test a new model that controls for the level of cash flows. Cross-sectional models, though not true substitutes for time-series models, can be highly useful to researchers examining event-specific earnings management as they provide industry-relative measures of abnormal accruals. This paper examines the cross-sectional Jones model and evaluates the performance of this model relative to that of the CFO model, which is an extension of the Jones model.
Because our focus is on the methodology used in detecting event-specific earnings management, we do not test the performance of the models in detecting non-event-specific earnings management. For example, our CFO model would be appropriate to apply to studies investigating earnings management around import relief investigations or seasoned equity offerings, though not necessarily to studies investigating income smoothing or maximization of managers' compensation over time.
Using a simulation analysis technique similar to that performed by Brown and Warner (1985) , we show that the cross-sectional Jones model and CFO model are well specified for randomly chosen firms. However, the Jones model yields systematically positive (negative) estimates of abnormal accruals for firms with cash flows below (above) their industry median. This finding demonstrates that the misspecification of the Jones model reported by Dechow, et al. (1995) is not limited to firms with extreme performances. In contrast to the Jones model, the CFO model is shown to be well specified for all cash flow levels. Further, the CFO model has greater power in detecting earnings management, particularly at lower levels of earnings manipulation.
We also examine the impact of differences in managerial incentives and abilities across fiscal quarters on the power of accrual models in detecting earnings management. For a random sample of firms, we show that squared abnormal returns are greater in the fourth quarter than in interim quarters, consistent with an argument that managers exhibit the greatest evidence of earnings management in the last quarter of a fiscal year. This is the quarter in which managers have the greatest incentives to achieve specified target levels of earnings.. The difference observed may also be argued to be consistent with a settling up of interim errors or misestimates.
In either case, however, the greater level of noise or manipulation in fourth quarters for reasons unrelated to a firm specific event suggests that estimates of abnormal accruals based on annual or fourth quarter data are likely to be particularly troublesome for earnings-based event studies.
This finding supports the use of interim data in examining earnings management issues whenever feasible. The sample for this table consists of 1000 firm-years randomly chosen from the universe of firm-years in the COMPUSTAT database. Total accruals are measured as ∆Receivables it + ∆Inventory it + ∆Other current assets it -∆Accounts payable it -∆Income tax payable it∆Other current liabilities it -Depreciation it , where change (∆) is computed between time t and time t-1. ∆Rev is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1 gppe is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t. ∆Rev is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1 gppe is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t cfo is the cash from operations for period t.
Firms in each estimation sample are sorted into quintiles based on cfo it /a it-1 and d1 i to d5 i are indicators for the cash flow quintile to which a firm belongs. ∆Rev is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1 gppe is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t. ∆Rev is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1 gppe is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t cfo is the cash from operations for period t.
Firms in each estimation sample are sorted into quintiles based on cfo it /a it-1 and d1 i to d5 i are indicators for the cash flow quintile to which a firm belongs. The sample for this table consists of 1000 randomly chosen firm-quarters. The variables and the accrual models are defined as in Table 2 .
The rows corresponding to 't-statistic' report the summary statistics for t-statistics associated with the parameter in the row above it.
TABLE 5
Rejection frequencies based on one-tailed t-statistics for the null hypothesis of no earnings management using annual data Firms in each industry are sorted into quintiles based on their cash from operations.
Quintile 1 = firms with the highest cash from operations (CFO), quintile 2 the next highest, etc.
A random sample of 1000 firm-quarters is then chosen across industries and cash flow quintiles for this analysis.
TABLE 7
Estimates from regression of abnormal accruals on cash from operations The sample for the regressions consists of 1000 randomly selected firm-quarters. The abnormal accruals, which is the dependent variable, is estimated using either the Jones or the CFO model. cfo it is cash from operations for firm i in period t. 
EM = earnings management
This analysis is based on 200 samples, each consisting of 100 randomly chosen-firm-quarters. The rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no earnings management are evaluated across the samples when a specified level of accrual manipulation (1%, 2% or 5% of total assets) is included for the chosen firm-quarters. When manipulation occurs using revenues, the specified level of manipulation is added to both the ∆rev it and to accruals (acc it ) in the models. For expense manipulation, only the accruals (acc it ) level is increased by the level of manipulation.
TABLE 9
Descriptive statistics on abnormal accruals and squared abnormal accruals classified by fiscal quarter. The sample for this table consists of 1000 randomly selected firm-years. Observations are included in the sample for a given firm-year only if data is available to estimate abnormal accruals in each of the quarters for that year. The sample for above figures consists of 20000 randomly selected firm-quarters. These observations are then sorted into 200 samples based on cash from operations (cfo it /a it-1 ). Figures 1 and 2 , plot the sample mean for abnormal accruals against the sample mean for cash from operations. Abnormal accruals in Figure 1 are estimated using the Jones model, while those in Figure 2 are estimated using the CFO model.
